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Objectives: The constitutional powers of the National Council of Justice challenge a 
constitutionally appropriate interpretation of its functions and constitutional 
consequences. This article analyzes the incidental control of constitutionality of 
administrative acts by such Council, based on article 37 of the Constitution of 1988, 
with the possibility to decline application of the law interpreted as unconstitutional. 
 
Methodology: The methodology used in this study is phenomenological-hermeneutic 
with literature review and analysis of the jurisprudence of the National Council of 
Justice and the Federal Supreme Court. 
Results: The thesis sustained in this paper states that the control of constitutionality 
of laws by administrative bodies loses relevance with the adoption of a robust system 
of judicial review in incidental and abstract forms, as currently observed in Brazil. On 
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the other hand, exceptionally, due to the powers of article 103-B, I and II of § 4 of the 
Federal Constitution, the National Council of Justice may carry out judicial review by 
administrative bodies, having as its control parameter especially article 37 of Federal 
Constitution, but with limitations and due deference to the precedents of the Federal 
Supreme Court to apply the constitutional principles of government and to resolve the 
conflict between constitutional norms. 
 
Contributions: The study mentions the peculiarities of the National Council of Justice  
(instituted by  Constitutional Amendment No. 45/2004) that are of special interest to 
analyze its institutional design and its place in rule of law, discussing the possibility of 
judicial review of administrative acts by the National Council of Justice with the non-
application of laws not yet declared unconstitutional by the Courts. 
 
KEYWORDS: National Council of Justice; judicial review by administrative bodies; 





Objetivos: As competências constitucionais do Conselho Nacional de Justiça 
desafiam uma interpretação constitucionalmente adequada das funções e das suas 
consequências constitucionais. Este artigo analisa o controle incidental de 
constitucionalidade dos atos administrativos do mencionado Conselho, a partir do art. 
37 da Constituição de 1988, com a possibilidade de afastamento da lei interpretada 
como inconstitucional. 
 
Metodologia: A metodologia utilizada neste estudo é fenomenológico-hermenêutica 
com revisão da literatura e análise da jurisprudência do Conselho Nacional de Justiça 
e do Supremo Tribunal Federal. 
 
Resultados: A tese sustentada neste trabalho afirma que o controle de 
constitucionalidade de leis por órgãos administrativos perde relevância com a adoção 
de robusto sistema de controle judicial de constitucionalidade nas modalidades 
incidental e abstrata, conforme se observa atualmente no Brasil. De outro lado, 
excepcionalmente em razão das competências dos incisos I e II do § 4º. do art. 103-
B, da Constituição de 1988, o Conselho Nacional de Justiça pode realizar controle 
administrativo de constitucionalidade, tendo como parâmetro de controle 
especialmente o art. 37 da Constituição de 1988, mas tendo limite e devendo 
deferência à jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal para concretizar os 
princípios constitucionais da administração pública e para solucionar a colisão entre 
normas constitucionais.  
Contribuições: O estudo traz as peculiaridades do Conselho Nacional de Justiça 
(instituído pela Emenda Constitucional nº. 45/2004), que são de especial interesse 
para analisar-se sua estrutura institucional e seu lugar no regramento do Direito ao 
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discutir a possibilidade de revisão judicial de atos administrativos pel Conselho 
Nacional de Justiça co a não aplicação de leis ainda não declaradas inconstitucionais 
pelos tribunais. 
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Conselho Nacional de Justiça; controle de constitucionalidade 





Since the discussions over the creation of a Justice Council to expand the 
mechanisms of control and accountability in the Judiciary branch, there has been 
controversy over the powers that this body should exercise due to the possibility of 
affronting the institutional independence and the decision-making independence of 
members of the judiciary. 
The Federal Supreme Court (STF) in Abstract Judicial Review (Direct Action 
of Unconstitutionality - ADI) nº. 3367 deemed the creation of the National Council of 
Justice (CNJ) constitutional by Constitutional Amendment (EC) nº. 45/2004, stating 
that this constitutional body is exclusively administrative in nature and has no 
jurisdiction over the STF. This article deals with the powers of the CNJ provided in 
items I and II of article 103-B, paragraph 4, CF/88, which consist of the power to 
regulate and control the acts of magistrates and judicial bodies subject to the 
supervisory power of the Council. 
The peculiarities of the body make it of special interest to analyze its 
institutional design and its place in rule of law, discussing the possibility of judicial 
review of administrative acts by the CNJ, with the non-application of laws not yet 
declared unconstitutional by the Courts. 
Thus, section 2 of this article deals with the Rule of Law in the 1988 Federal 
Constitution, the Brazilian justice system and the institutional design of the National 
Council of Justice. Subsequently, section 3 reflects on the first opinions of the Federal 
Supreme Court of the powers of the National Council of Justice, these precedents 
being the first layer of understanding of the Council's constitutionally appropriate 
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sphere of action. 
On the other hand, section 4 analyses the new understanding of the STF in 
relation to the constitutional role of the CNJ, stating in some Federal Supreme Court 
judgments that the Council may rule out the application of laws that have not yet been 
declared unconstitutional in court in certain cases. This current moment is referred to 
as the second layer of the STF's understanding of the powers of the Council. Section 
5 presents the limits and possibilities for the CNJ to carry out incidental control of 
constitutionality administratively (judicial review by administrative bodies). Finally, the 
conclusions are stated in section 6. 
 
 
2  STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF THE 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE 
 
The institutional design of the 1988 Constitution strengthened the justice 
system in a unique way in our history. Some reasons can be listed for this 
phenomenon. 
In the first place, in contemporary constitutional democracies, the Courts are 
guardians of the Constitution1, having as their constitutional mandate the protection of 
fundamental rights, the control of state and political power and the maintenance of the 
rules of the democracy. It should not be forgotten that the 1988 Federal Constitution 
(CF/88) is an important in the transition to a democratic regime2. It seeks to overcome 
hyper-presidentialism with a more adequate and balanced horizontal distribution of 
state powers amongst the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, 
in addition to securing important roles to constitutionally autonomous institutions such 
as the Public Prosecution Service (Ministério Público) and the Public Defender's Office 
(Defensoria Pública)3. It was also observed the greater constitutional scope of the 
 
1 On this issue, see cf. KELSEN, 1995; FIOROVANTI, 2001; COSTA, 2006, p. 95-198; ROBL FILHO; 
SCHELEDER, 2016, p. 9-41. Para uma visão crítica, cf. JONES, p. 773-806, Spring 2019. 
2 See O’DONNELL, 1998, p. 27-54; ROBL FILHO, 2012, p. 66-95. 
3 On hyperpresidentialism, see MACEDO, 2014, p. 496-518.  
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Brazilian justice system, which is in tune with the worldwide trend movement on the 
expansion of the recognition of fundamental and human rights with the consequent 
possibility of immediate invocation of these rights in courts, extending the adjudication 
of numerous social phenomena4. 
In this context, the Original Constituent Power and the Derived Constituent 
Power establish the administrative, financial and budgetary autonomy of the Judiciary, 
essential for the exercise of their constitutional attributions5. Administrative autonomy 
consists of the power to choose members and auxiliary services, in particular by means 
of a public exam, as well as the organization of jurisdiction. On the other hand, 
budgetary autonomy is expressed in the participation in the preparation of the 
Budgetary Annual Guideline (LDO) and in the preparation of a budgetary proposal, 
observing the LDO. The proposal must necessarily be compiled by the Executive 
Branch and sent to the Legislative Branch for it to carry out its deliberations. In turn, 
financial autonomy concerns especially the use and management of the resources that 
are allocated to the Judiciary6. 
The members of the Judiciary (Judges and Justices) are invested in a lifetime 
position, only losing the position by judicial decision. They are also invested with 
immovability, which prohibits the change of the previously assigned jurisdictions, with 
the exception of the possible application of sanctions for disciplinary offences and 
situations that a judge is need in other place. Lastly, they are invested with irreducibility 
of salary, which prohibits the reduction of the nominal value of salaries. These 
guarantees are essential for the maintenance of the functional independence of the 
members of the judiciary; that is, they are intended to ensure that judges are able to 
exercise their constitutional and legal functions in a manner that is free from 
unnecessary interference, with a view to ensuring that the decisions are taken 
exclusively in the light of the reasonable interpretation of the law. 
However, it is not uncommon accountability lapses in the Judiciary, which led 
to the enactment of Constitutional Amendment nº. 45 of 2004, under the terms of article 
 
4 See FEREJOHN, 2002, p. 41-69. 
5 See CLÈVE, 2011, p. 659-675. 
6 See ROBL FILHO, 2013, p. 130-179. 
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103-B, CF/887. The duty of authorities and bodies to provide information and to provide 
justifications for their actions and omissions, which, if unsatisfactory, imply financial, 
administrative or criminal8 penalties, is inherent to democratic accountability. 
The constitutional powers of CNJ is exercised mainly as an administrative and 
financial control of the Judiciary and as an inspection of the fulfillment of the law duties 
of its members (art. 103-B, § 4, caput, CF/88). The constitutional norm gives the CNJ 
the power to ensure the autonomy of the Judiciary and compliance with the Statute of 
Judicature (Estatuto da Magistratura), exercising it regulatory power and suggest 
measures in its field of action. 
The Constitution charges the Council to ensure compliance with the 
constitutional principles of Public Administration (legality, impersonality, efficiency, 
morality and publicity). The literal expression of the constitutional text states that the 
CNJ is responsible for nullifying and reviewing administrative acts that violate legality 
practiced by members of the judiciary and judicial bodies, and for determining 
measures for the precise compliance with the law (articles 103-B, paragraph 4, II, 
CF/88). The competence enshrined in clauses I and II of Paragraph 4 of Article 103-
B, CF/88 are the specific object of study of this article. 
CNJ composition is essential to understand its powers. The Presidency of the 
Council is attributed to the President of the Federal Supreme Court, also including a 
Justice of the Superior Court of Justice (STJ), a Justice of the Superior Court of Labor 
(TST), a Labor Appellate Justice and a Labor Judge, appointed by the TST, a State 
Justice and a State Judge, appointed by the STF, a Federal Appellate Justice and a 
Federal Judge, appointed by the STJ, thus 60% of the members are Judges or 
Justices, according to art. 130-A, I to IX, CF/88. 
The Council is also composed of two lawyers appointed by the Federal Council 
of the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB) and two citizens with outstanding legal 
knowledge, one appointed by the Chamber of Deputies and the other by the Federal 
Senate, pursuant to Articles 103-B, V and VI, CF/88. Finally, the CNJ is composed of 
 
7 See TOMIO, 2013. 
8 On the analytical concept of accountability, cf. SCHEDLER, 1999, p. 13-28. 
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a member of the Public Prosecution Service of the Union (Ministério Público da União) 
and a member of the State Public Prosecution Service (Ministério Público Estadual) 
appointed by the Attorney General of the Republic. 
This composition led Gilberto Bercovici to point out that the CNJ is not a body 
of external control of the judiciary, but of internal control (accountability)9. This same 
conclusion was reached on the direct action of unconstitutionality that was filed against 
the very creation of the council (STF, 2005).  
It should be noted that relevant constitutional bodies such as the Federal 
Supreme Court, the Superior Court of Justice, the Attorney General's Office, the 
Federal Council of the Brazilian Bar Association, the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Federal Senate make the nominations for the composition of the CNJ, which must be 
approved by an absolute majority of the Federal Senate in order for appointments to 
take place subsequently by action of the President of the Republic. Thus, the 
nomination process involves important institutions and especially important legal 
actors, allowing complex and constitutionally appropriate a priori legal analyses, a 
particularity that also influences the question of the possibility of a certain judicial 
review by the administrative body, as will be addressed at the end of this article. 
The Presidency of the CNJ is attributed to the President of the Federal 
Supreme Court, head of the National Judiciary. The Attorney General of the Republic 
or his representative has the right to speak (voice) in the Council. These relevant actors 
of concentrated and abstract judicial review participate, therefore, in the CNJ, which 
points positively to the technical capacity of the body to carry out judicial review. 
 
 
3  FIRST LAYER: THE CNJ'S POWERS AND ITS SCRUTINY BY THE STF 
 
J.H. Weiler proposes an analysis of the law as geological layers (WEILER, 
2004, p.548-549), and this conception can be adopted in Constitutional Law 
(CANOTILHO, 2008, p.325-334). The case law of the Federal Supreme Court on the 
 
9 On this theme, BERCOVICI, 2005, p. 185-191. 
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National Council of Justice can be examined in this way. There are STF decisions that 
establish the structure and the main concepts of the CNJ’s powers, making up the 
first geological layer. Subsequently in the second geological layer, in view of new 
developments in reality, the jurisprudence on the powers of the body is refined, 
producing a resized geological design. 
In a first of these layers (moments), the STF took care to establish the basic 
understanding on the competencies of the CNJ and especially on clauses I and II of 
§ 4 of art. 103-B, CF/88. In this context, the STF's essential judgment on the 
powers of the CNJ in Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (ADI) nº. 3367, which ensured 
the constitutional legitimacy of the creation of the Council. 
In the opinion, the Federal Supreme Court understood that: a) there is no 
violation of the irrevocable clause of the separation of powers in the creation of the 
CNJ, since it is a matter of internal administrative, financial and disciplinary control of 
the judiciary and not external control; b) the CNJ does not violate the essential 
(political) core of the separation of powers, because this Council has only an 
administrative functions, maintaining the impartial jurisdictional function and 
independent of magistrates and courts; c) the Council is located under the STF in 
hierarchy, not exercising control over the top body of the national judiciary in Brazil; 
d) The Judiciary Power is national, having a unitary character, therefore the 
Federal Justice and the State Justice are organs that compose the Brazilian national 
judiciary, not existing a Judiciary Power of the federal entity Union and Judiciary 
Powers of each one of the member states; e) since the Judiciary Power is national, it 
is not possible constitutionally to establish State Justice Councils; and f) citizens with 
notorious legal and moral knowledge indicated by the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Federal Senate and lawyers in the exercise of the function of Councilors can only work 
supplementary in one teaching position, since they act as Justices. 
The STF recognized the need to improve the self-government of the Judiciary 
and expand the internal control mechanisms over judges, which until then had been 
substantially centered on the co-regulatory bodies of the courts (STF, 2005, p.229-
232). 
The decision in ADI nº. 3367 was based on the literal understanding of 
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subparagraph 'r' of item I of art. 102, I, 'r', CF/88 resulting from the Amendment to the 
Constitution nº. 45/2004, when it affirmed the powers of the STF to analyze actions 
against acts of the CNJ, instituted by the constitutional reform as a body of the 
National Judiciary, necessarily submitted to the scrutiny of the Court located at the top 
of the judicial structure (STF, 2005, p.255-256). 
It was pointed out that it was not intended that the exercise of constitutional 
powers of the CNJ could undermine the independence of magistrates in the provision 
of jurisdiction. The independence of the judiciary remained untouched (STF, 2005, 
p.280-282). 
Diverging from the formed majority, it is of interest to register the vote of Justice 
Marco Aurélio due to the unconstitutionality of the provisions of EC nº. 45 relating to 
the CNJ. One of the foundations he presented is expressed in the warning that "we 
cannot be naive enough to believe that the activity to be developed by the National 
Council of Justice will not have repercussions on the judicial office, exercised by human 
beings", to which he added his conviction of not being able "to imagine a body of the 
Judiciary that does not exercise the judicial office itself" (STF, 2005, p.310-317). This 
warning from Justice Marco Aurélio hovers today, impacting, on some decisions and 
acts of the CNJ that influence the exercise of jurisdiction.  
Still, and notwithstanding the persuasive power of the arguments centered on 
the national character of the Judiciary, presented by the Rapporteur of ADI no. 3361, 
one cannot easily deny the existence of a certain judicial federalism resulting from the 
recognition of the autonomy of the state judiciaries, bearing in mind that "the 
establishment of a composite State, autonomous or federal, (...) will have 
consequences on the configuration of the legislative and executive powers, as well as 
(...) on the judiciary operating in these systems"10. 
Another relevant judgment of the Federal Supreme Court on the powers and 
constitutional status of the CNJ was Declaratory Action of Constitutionality – 
Temporary Injunction (ADC) nº. 12, regarding the constitutionality of the Resolution 
 
10 RUIZ, 1994, p. 15.  In the: “El establecimiento de un Estado «compuesto», autonómico o federal, (...) 
tendrá consecuencias no sólo en la consiguiente configuración de los poderes legislativo y ejecutivo 
sino también (...) en el poder judicial operante en dichos sistemas”.. 
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CNJ nº. 07/2005 that prohibits nepotism in the Judiciary branch. In addition, this trial is 
part of the first layer of the decisions of the STF defining the normative feature of the 
CNJ. 
The reasons and grounds for the judgment in the ADC were reaffirmed in the 
final judgment on the merits, distinguishing the following arguments: a) as can be 
comprehended from the Constitution, the CNJ's regulatory power involves the 
possibility of innovating the legal system, expressing primary normative will; b) the 
powers can be described from one unexpressed core and four expressed cores, the 
latter being composed 1. for ensuring the observance of the constitutional principles of 
government, 2. assessing the legality of the acts practiced by the Judiciary, 3. nullifying 
illegal acts and setting deadlines for the necessary measures for the faithful 
compliance with the law and 4. analyzing the efficiency, effectiveness and economy of 
the management of the Judiciary, c) the unexpressed nucleus of competence 
encompasses the possibility of creating primary normative acts on issues included in 
the expressed nucleus, d) the CNJ can directly apply the Federal Constitution within 
the scope of its constitutional powers and e) the judiciary in Brazil, despite the 
existence of state courts and magistrates, is national in character; thus both the federal 
and the state courts make up the national judiciary (STF, 2006a). 
In his opinion, Ministro Menezes Direito declared the complex constitutional 
role of the National Council of Justice, which, despite being an administrative and non-
judicial body, uses traditionally jurisdictional expedients, such as the granting of 
precautionary measures in its administrative proceedings and procedures. It also 
registered the constitutional competence of the CNJ to put into effect the constitutional 
principles set forth in art. 37, caput, CF/88 (STF, 2006a). This power of the CNJ will be 
useful for the analysis of the possibility of the incidental judicial review in the trial of 
cases by the Council11. 
After the judgment of ADI nº. 3367 and ADC nº. 12, two other essential issues 
for the configuration of the CNJ were the object of the attention of the STF: a) the 
delimitation of the power of the Federal Supreme Court to analyze the acts of the CNJ 
 
11 On this complex regulatory power of the CNJ and the need to respect fundamental rights, see ROBL 
FILHO, 2017, p. 40 - 67. 
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(art. 102, I, 'r', CF/88) and b) the construction of the role of the CNJ in judicial review 
of administrative and normative acts, the latter being viewed as the second layer of the 
current structure of the CNJ. The Federal Constitution establishes, in article 102, I, that 
it is originally the responsibility of the Federal Supreme Court, preciously, to safeguard 
the Constitution, and is responsible for processing and judging, originally, "r) litigation 
against the National Council of Justice and against the National Council of the Public 
Prosecution Service". This wording allows us to say that the Federal Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction to review any and all acts of the CNJ that may be the subject of litigation 
that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.  
Apart from these instruments, the STF ruled that it is not possible to file popular 
action (ação popular) against acts of the National Council of Justice. The exception to 
this rule is subparagraph 'n' of Section I of Article 102, CF/88, which establishes the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court over "actions in which all members of the 
judiciary are directly or indirectly interested, and those in which more than half of the 
members of the court of origin are prevented or directly or indirectly interested" and in 
the case of a dispute between the Union and a Member State (STF, 2006c). 
On the other hand, precedents of the Federal Supreme Court has clarified that, 
when the National Council of Justice maintains acts and decisions of other bodies and 
judges in a lawsuit, therefore, that does not impose an active behavior for the bodies 
it inspects, it does not open competence for the Supreme Court to review the 
deliberation of the CNJ. Thus, if the Council considers valid a provision issued by the 
Court of Justice or a judgment rendered in a disciplinary proceeding by a competent 
body of the Federal Regional Court, the act of the CNJ will not have altered what 
already exists, not attracting the jurisdiction of the STF12. The applicable lawsuit is 
restricted to those filed against the positive act of the CNJ. 
Furthermore, the Federal Supreme Court understands that only the 
Constitutional Actions (Writ of Mandamus, Habeas Data, Habeas Corpus and Writ of 
Injunction) against acts of the CNJ are of its jurisdiction, and the ordinary actions are 
of the jurisdiction of the Federal Judges. There are two main arguments that support 
 
12 See STF, 2011b. 
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this position: a) the fact that the list of powers of the Federal Supreme Court is 
exhaustive and strict and b) the fact that, in civil lawsuits, it is the Federal Government, 
and not the CNJ, that is the respondent13. Thus, it would not be applicable Original 
Civil Actions against acts of the CNJ, because the legitimacy of the Federal 
Government imposes the judgment by the federal district judge14. 
This understanding induces practical and systematic problems. The 
composition of the National Council of Justice includes the President of the Federal 
Supreme Court, a Justice of the Superior Court of Justice, a Justice of the Superior 
Labor Court and a Justice of the Federal Regional Court. In this way, the situation 
arises, which gives rise to some perplexity and risk to the functionality of the system, 
of a federal district judge finding himself in the position of reviewing a legal opinion of 
body of 15 (fifteen) Counselors, among them the President of the Federal Supreme 
Court and other members of Superior Courts and of appellate courts. 
Even greater perplexity regarding the functionality of the judicial system, 
especially with regard to the independence of the judiciary, led to Recommendation nº. 
38 of the National Inspector General's Office of Justice of 2019. The act orders the 
Courts "to comply with the normative acts and decisions rendered by the National 
Inspector General's Office of Justice, even if there is a contradictory judicial order, 
except if it comes from the Federal Supreme Court" (CNJ, 2019). The 
Recommendation leads to judges and appellate justices ceasing to fully exercise the 
jurisdiction in which they are constitutionally vested. Otherwise and in MS (Writ of 
Mandamus) nº. 36549 MC15, the conclusion was the unconstitutionality of the agency’s 






13 See STF, 2013. 
14 On the issue of the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction and its impact on the provision of the 
jurisdiction and especially on this understanding of the STF, see MARRAFON; ROBL FILHO, 2014, 
p.1441-1442. 
15 Rel. Min. Marco Aurélio, DJe 1-7-2019. 
Revista Jurídica                        vol. 04, n°. 57, Curitiba, 2019. pp. 221 - 248 
                                                                              
_________________________________________  
 
Revista Jurídica Unicuritiba. Curitiba.V.04, n.57, p.221-248, Out-Dez. 2019 
 [Received/Recebido: Agosto 25, 2018; Accepted/Aceito: Agosto 03, 2019] 
 
Este obra está licenciado com uma Licença Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial 4.0 Internacional. 
4  SECOND LAYER: THE CNJ'S JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE STF'S DECISIONS 
ON THIS MATTER 
 
A more complex issue relates to the possibility of the National Council of 
Justice judging the constitutionality of normative acts, ruling out the application of laws 
not yet considered unconstitutional in court, which have been invoked as grounds for 
lawsuits of agents submitted to the supervision of the Council. An overview of STF 
precedents in this regard may entangle the observer in uncertainty. The issue has to 
do with the possibility of non-judicial and administrative bodies refusing to apply laws 
they consider unconstitutional. 
When 1988 Constitution came into force, the STF proclaimed that "the 
Executive and Legislative Branches may declare their administrative acts null (…) on 
the grounds of illegality or unconstitutionality, and not laws or acts with the force of 
law," since "it is the private responsibility of the Judiciary to declare them 
unconstitutional" (STF, 1990). Therefore, only in the exercise of a jurisdictional power 
would the system of separation of powers allow the declaration of unconstitutionality of 
the law. 
At the same time, several monocratic decisions by STF members between 2006 
and 2010 gave rise to the thesis that not even the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) 
could rule out the law as unconstitutional, and that the Súmula (Ancient Precedent) 347 
that admitted it had been overruled. The premise of the reasoning was that, by nature, 
the declaration of unconstitutionality is a jurisdictional act and that only the exception to 
the TCU was admitted, because there were not, under the Constitution of 1946, in force 
at the time of the precedent, expeditious means to provoke the judiciary to proclaim 
the law is unconstitutional, in time to perform the analysis of the act submitted to the 
Court of Accounts (Tribunal de Contas). With the current expansion of abstract judicial 
in Brazil, the problem no longer required an exceptional solution. Justice Gilmar 
Mendes took the pioneering decision along these lines when he granted, 
monocratically, a writ of mandamus (STF, 2006b). In addition to that decision, there 
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were several other decisions on similar grounds, all of which were monocratic.16 
However, in 2011, the STF Plenary denied a writ of mandamus in which it 
attacked the CNJ's decision affirming the unconstitutionality of the state law (STF, 
2011a). Law nº. 8.943/2008 of the State of Mato Grosso attributed a percentage of 
court costs and notary fees to private entities. In the CNJ, the law had not been applied, 
even though it had not yet been the object of criticism in jurisdictional courts. The 
Council's decision was expressly based on STF rulings that were averse to the 
distribution of court costs to private entities (CNJ, 2009). 
In the case, the Supreme Court refused the power of the CNJ to declare the 
unconstitutionality of the law, but maintained the Council's deliberation on its merits, 
declaring, the Court itself, incidentally, the unconstitutionality of the normative law of 
the Member State.  
A second layer of STF jurisprudence on the competence of the CNJ and 
especially on clauses I and II of § 4 of article 103-B, CF/88 is beginning to be formed, 
changing and deepening the reflection over legal perspectives and conceptions. 
In 2016, the STF directly admitted the competence of the CNJ to rule out the 
application of a law that it considers unconstitutional, when this is indispensable for the 
evaluation of acts submitted to the inspection of the Council. The case in question 
concerned the dismissal of 100 (one hundred) commissioned (temporary) positions in 
the Court of Justice of Paraíba, which were provided for by State Law nº. 8.223/2007. 
The National Council of Justice understood that the state law violated the 
constitutional hypotheses of creation of positions in commission (temporary), under the 
terms of art. 37, II and V, CF/88 (CNJ, 2009). Thus, the administrative acts of 
appointment and inauguration practiced by the State Court of Justice were 
unconstitutional, and appointments by the Council were declared null. The 
 
16 See specific study of SINDIRECEITA, by CAVALCANTI, Alessandra Damian et al, mimeo, points out 
these other decisions, issued in Mandados de Segurança 25.986-MC/DF, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, 
DJ 30/06/2006; 26.410-MC/DF, Relator: Min. Ricardo Lewandowski, DJ 02/03/2007; 27.837-MC/DF, 
Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, DJe 05/02/2009; 27.232-MC/DF, 27.337-MC/DF, 27.344-MC/DF e 
28.252-MC/DF, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, DJe 20/05/2008, 28/05/2008, 02/06/2008 e 29/09/2009; 
27.743-MC/DF, Relatora: Mina. Cármen Lúcia, DJe 15/12/2008; 26.783-MC/DF e 26.808-MC/DF, 
Relatora: Mina. Ellen Gracie, DJ 01/08/2007 e 02/08/2007; e na Ação Cautelar 1.193-MC-QO/RJ, 
Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, 2ª Turma, DJ 30/06/2006. 
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unlawfulness (antijuridicidade) of State Law nº. 8.223/2007 - a term used by the CNJ, 
not being used the word unconstitutionality - was taken as evidenced by the 
jurisprudence of the STF around other similar laws, mentioning the one that was 
violated in ADI no. 3.233 on 05/10/2017. The CNJ concluded that, in this case, "other 
is the law, other is the nomenclature of posts, other is their legal definition. However, 
the open exile of the constitutional requirements to regulate the provision of public 
offices (...) unfortunately persists" (CNJ, 2009). 
It is interesting to note that initially the STF granted a precautionary measure 
to suspend the effects of the decision of the CNJ Plenary, which declared null the 
appointments of commissioned positions based on State Law nº. 8.223/2007, 
understanding that the powers provided for in article 103-B, paragraph 4, II, CF/88 did 
not allow the declaration of unconstitutionality of such law (STF, 2009). In sum, the 
injunction held that the CNJ was not competent to declare the law unconstitutional, 
following the position established by the STF in the first layer of the constitutional 
jurisdiction on the matter.  
This opinion was reviewed in the substantive judgment of Petition 4656, when 
the STF Full Bench affirmed that it was possible for the Council to rule out the 
imposition of an unconstitutional law that has effects on acts performed or to be 
performed by agencies of the Judiciary, since article 103-B, paragraph 4, II, of the 
Constitution is responsible for ensuring compliance with article 37 of the same 
Constitution. 
The opinion of the rapporteur, Justice Carmen Lúcia, can be summarized as 
follows (STF, 2016, fls.244-254): a) the President of the Republic and the autonomous 
administrative bodies, which must control the validity of administrative acts, must make 
an analysis of the constitutionality of laws that support administrative acts, b) this form 
of constitutionality control (judicial review by administrative bodies and agencies) is an 
implicit competence attributed to the CNJ, c) this is a legal understanding that 
corroborates the ideal of the open society of interpreters of the Constitution, d) the 
denial of the application of the law due to unconstitutionality depends on the vote of an 
absolute majority of its members, applying here also the constitutional clause of the 
plenary reserve established in article. 97, CF/88, e) after the conclusion of a concrete 
Revista Jurídica                        vol. 04, n°. 57, Curitiba, 2019. pp. 221 - 248 
                                                                              
_________________________________________  
 
Revista Jurídica Unicuritiba. Curitiba.V.04, n.57, p.221-248, Out-Dez. 2019 
 [Received/Recebido: Agosto 25, 2018; Accepted/Aceito: Agosto 03, 2019] 
 
Este obra está licenciado com uma Licença Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial 4.0 Internacional. 
judgment that considered the law unconstitutional, the CNJ may use regulatory power 
"to impose on the bodies constitutionally submitted to its inspection activities the 
invalidity of an administrative act due to the inapplicability of the legal text (STF, 2016, 
fl. 249) " and f) this incidental judicial review in the administrative decision does not 
lead to the annulment or revocation of the law, which remains in force, until the STF 
declares it null. 
In the trial, Justice Ricardo Lewandowski pointed out that the CNJ, there, 
"simply [invoked] precedents of the Federal Supreme Court itself, to determine the 
dismissal of those servants who were hired in disagreement with what the Constitution 
establishes in art. 37” (STF, 2016, fl. 279). The vote of Justice Luiz Fux emphasizes 
that the recognition of the competence of the CNJ to refuse to apply a law that he 
considers unconstitutional was being admitted, because the STF had already declared 
contrary to the Constitution law of practically the same content. He then refers to the 
point of view sustained at another time by Justice Gilmar Mendes that certain agencies, 
even not being charged with providing jurisdiction, could apply the position of the STF's 
case law to affirm the unconstitutionality of the law (STF, 2016, fl. 292). 
Justice Luiz Fux then pointed out that the case heard by the CNJ involved a 
law substantially the same as another that the STF had already declared 
unconstitutional in a judicial review. He stated: 
 
 
Thus, after the judgment of this Court - ADI 3.233 -, the purpose of the 
legislative changes is to maintain, under a new guise, the same content of the 
original rule, with the simple alteration of the respective name, remaining 
equal - and unconstitutional - the nature and attributions of the position (STF, 
2016, fl. 302). 
 
 
He went on to emphasize that the disregard of the law obeyed the intelligence 
already formed by the STF on the precise issue under discussion: 
 
 
It is precisely for this reason that the CNJ Plenary considered it necessary to 
open, on its own initiative, an Administrative Control Procedure to investigate 
the possible repetition of the practice of irregular appointments of servants by 
the Court of Justice of the State of Paraíba, after which, identifying in the 
contested law the same defect that had tarnished the rules declared 
unconstitutional in Direct Action for Unconstitutionality 3.233, ordered the 
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dismissal of commissioners (…). Such arguments can only confirm the 
reiterated and peaceful position of the Federal Supreme Court on the matter, 
so as to support the possibility of the National Council of Justice ruling out the 
application of the rule, as a sufficient argumentative burden, materialized in 
a previous analysis of this Court about the unconstitutionality of the matter 
conveyed to the CNJ (STF, 2016, fl.302). 
 
 
Speaking specifically on the competence of the CNJ to refuse to apply the law 
on the grounds of unconstitutionality, the Justice emphasized the fact that the CNJ 
was dealing with the problem due to the performance of a task assigned to it by the 
constituent and the fact that the unconstitutionality was clear, since it reflected a 
situation already examined and judged by the STF (2016, fls.302-303): 
 
 
Finally, I refute the alleged incompetence of the CNJ, as an administrative 
body, to render the contested decision. In fact, the verification of 
administrative acts, including the appointment to commission positions in 
flagrant disrespect of the constitutional rule of public competition and the 
jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court, is in line with the provision of 
constitutional jurisdiction, which prescribes the jurisdiction of the National 
Council of Justice for the control of the administrative and financial 
performance of the Judiciary (CRFB/88, art. 1). 103-B, § 4), ensuring the 
observance of art. 37 and assessing, ex officio or through provocation, the 
legality of administrative acts performed by members or bodies of the 
Judiciary (CRFB/88, art. 103-B, § 4, item II). (...) However, in order not to 
vulgarize and broaden the jurisdiction of the National Council of Justice in an 
unlimited manner, it states, as a theoretical premise, that the removal of laws 
or normative acts should only occur in cases of complete and uncontested 
outrage to the Constitution - certainly enhanced by precedents of this Federal 
Supreme Court on the matter -, so that in situations of reasonable doubt 
about the content of the adverse rule, the option made by the legislator, 




The possibility judicial review by the CNJ was admitted, but in a peculiar 
situation.  
Therefore, in a judgment of the National Council of Justice on February 20, 
2018, Justice Cármen Lúcia stressed that the Council "was created as an 
administrative body. It is not a judicial body, does not exercise jurisdiction and does 
not declare any rule unconstitutional. Anything more than that is exorbitant of the 
Council's constitutional powers. It's that simple” (CNJ, 2018b). This was stated in 
Process nº. 0001809-93.2016.2.00.0000, which involved the application of Bahia 
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State Law nº. 13.555/2016, establishing the Special Compensation Fund (FECOM) for 
notarial and registration activities. 
In addition to providing compensation for free acts performed by civil registrars 
of natural persons and the granting of daily allowance for services that do not collect 
enough for their costs, this state law provided for the payment of salaries of public 
employees who still perform the notarial and registration activities that should be 
assigned to private individuals, although the fees in these "state-owned" services are 
assigned to the State, pursuant to State Law nº. 13.555/2016. 
The Rapporteur of Administrative Process, Minister Cármen Lúcia, based the 
impossibility for the CNJ to perform concrete and incidental constitutionality control 
(judicial review), in a monocratic decision of Justice Celso de Mello of June 18, 2018,  
in the Federal Supreme Court, which had dismissed the judgment of the CNJ (STF, 
2018)17. In turn, the majority of Counselors Justices of the Council viewed the 
possibility of controlling the unconstitutionality of the allocation of funds from the 
FECOM in the Request for Providence nº. 0001809-93.2016.2.00.0000, which is 
constituted by the collection of amounts from private users of notarial and registration 
activities for payment of the remuneration of public servants who temporarily perform 
notarial and registration services, as observed in the votes of Councilors Valdetário 
Andrade Monteiro, André Luiz Guimarães Godinho and Arnaldo Hossepian. 
In any case, it can be said that the jurisprudential scenario is still not 






17 Originated against the decision of the CNJ, 2013. 
18 Recently, the Attorney General of the Republic expressed her opinion (PGR, N.º 59/2019 – 
AJA/SGJ/PGR, sistema único n.º PGR-MANIFESTAÇÃO-44629/2019) at STF, 2018, on the 
unconstitutionality of the decision of the CNJ in the Pedido de Providências nº. 0005230-
38.2009.2.00.0000, Relator: José Adonis Callou de Araújo Sá, Julgamento: 01/06/2010, which imposed 
on the Court of Justice of the State of Bahia to cease applying Resolution nº. 1/1992 for violation of 
constitutional provisions. This determination by the CNJ is also suspended due to another injunction 
granted by Justice Celso de Mello. 
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5 LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW BY THE NATIONAL 
COUNCIL OF JUSTICE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE RULE OF LAW. A 
MATTER OF COMPETENCE (POWER) 
 
The issue of the possibility of administrative bodies carrying out judicial review 
is not definitively settled, and there is no sure consensus over this matter not even of 
comparative law. 
In Brazil, Gilmar Mendes (1997, p.18-19) and Lucas Catib de Laurentiis (2012, 
p.141-142) suggest that the possibility of non-application of the law understood as 
unconstitutional by the Public Administration was defended with persuasive arguments 
before the advent of abstract judicial review, instituted by Constitutional Amendment 
nº. 16/1965. The reason was based on the difficulty of the administration to obtain 
judicially the declaration of nullity of the law due to formal or material defects of 
constitutionality. Only the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic was in charge 
of judicial review lawsuits. The holder of the office remained in charge as long as he 
enjoyed the confidence of the authority who appointed him, the President of the 
Republic. 
With the 1988 Constitution, there are many plaintiffs in the Direct Action of 
Unconstitutionality, encompassing authorities that previously did not have access by 
themselves to this instance. 
The phenomenon expanded with the creation of abstract state judicial review, 
for the judicial review of municipal and state laws in light of the State Constitution. The 
Allegation of Disobedience of Fundamental Precept (ADPF) has opened even more 
space for the jurisdictional unleashing of constitutional controversies. This new system 
of judicial review with the possibility of granting precautionary measures decreased the 
need for administrative authorities having to make their own judgments on the validity 
of the law - a task, not infrequently, of complex multidisciplinary overlaps that require 
unique legal expertise.19 
 
19 On this theme: MARRAFON, 2010. In STF, Justice Gilmar Mendes' decision in MS 25,888, when 
granting the request for an injunction to suspend the effects of the decision rendered by the Federal 
Court of Accounts: "It is necessary to take into account that the constitutional text of 1988 introduced a 
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It is also important to remember that administrative bodies are often focused 
on their immediate problems and interests and are not able to do complex 
constitutional interpretation. 
The Executive Power and administrative bodies often find themselves 
entangled in party political agendas, being constrained by strategies aimed at seeking 
immediate popular support, which are not always in line with the counter-majority 
implications involved in an adequate appreciation of the constitutionality of laws. 
In the current context of diversification of mechanisms of access to 
jurisdictional judicial review, finally, the reasons for granting the administration the 
power to refuse the application of the law on grounds of unconstitutionality have been 
largely emptied. This does not mean that the administrative bodies are not subject to 
the Federal Constitution nor does it disregard the ideal of an open society of 
interpreters of the Constitution20, in which also non-judicial entities are called, in 
various ways, to implement the Constitution. The problem is solved, in reality, as a 
matter of competence (power). 
This discussion, as can be seen, focuses on an investigation into the power of 
a body with an administrative mission to refuse to apply a law by arguments of 
unconstitutionality.  
This literature is particularly scarce in Brazil, which, when it approaches the 
problem, devotes few pages of attention to it. André Salgado de Matos, on this matter, 
notes that the scenario is similar in Portugal, noting that "[…] a superficial heuristic 
analysis immediately reveals the scarce depth reached in general by the doctrinal 
treatment of the subject" (MATOS, 2004, p.153). It is reported that authors of renowned 
reputation, but who form a minority, affirm that it is up to the Administration to suspend 
its decision, while waiting for a position of the courts, or affirm the absolute 
incompetence to refuse application the law for reasons of constitutionality. The majority 
 
radical change in our system of judicial review. (...) The broad legitimacy given to abstract judicial review, 
with the inevitable possibility of submitting any constitutional matter to the Federal Supreme Court, 
brought about a substantial change in the model of judicial review (…). It seems almost intuitive that, by 
significantly widening the circle of entities and bodies legitimized to provoke the Federal Supreme Court 
in the process of abstract control of rules, the constituent ended up restricting, in a radical way, the 
amplitude of the diffuse control of constitutionality”. 
20 See HÄBERLE, 1997. 
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would, however, be inclined to admit a limited and exceptional attribution to this. 
Nobody ventures to maintain that there is an unrestricted power of the administration 
in this area (MATOS, 2004, p.153-156). 
In Spain, the author reveals surprise at the lack of interest in this theme 




The admission of a competence of unrestricted non-application is a minority 
(...) The generality of the doctrine is divided between the acceptance of a 
competence of limited or exceptional non-application and its total rejection 
(MATOS, 2004, p.120-121). 
 
 
It is interesting to note that the terms in which this controversy develops in 
foreign doctrine corresponds to the arguments that, without seeking support in national 
or comparative literature, are raised both in the CNJ and in the STF. 
The reasons against which non-judicial bodies could refuse to apply laws that 
they consider unconstitutional are based on the idea that a Power would only be 
legitimized to interfere in the exercise of the legislative power to the extent that it 
received its own constitutional mandate for this - which would exclude the possibility of 
judicial review by administrative bodies, in application of the principle of separation of 
powers. It is common for the assertion to be made that administrative bodies are 
governed by the principle of legality, reinforced by the presumption of constitutionality 
of laws, which should only be removed by judges. 
No less significant is the argument that arises from the presumption of 
constitutionality of laws, in the sense that overcoming the prima facie validity of laws 
requires robust conviction about the defect of unconstitutionality, to be achieved with 
consistent legal analysis, which requires specialized knowledge and practices, alien to 
the vast majority of administrative bodies. 
Moreover, it is certain that reasons of legal security are added against the 
recognition of the competence of administrative entities to refuse a law because they 
see in it hostility to the Constitution. In terms of legal certainty, there is a danger that 
the judicial review by administrative bodies may consolidate individual situations that 
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are difficult to reverse if the constitutional jurisdiction understands that the 
administrative assessment was wrong. 
These are serious reasons why, at least as a general rule, the administrative 
review of the constitutionality of the laws is not accepted as correct. 
On the other hand, it should also be noted that, in certain cases, the solution 
of suspending the administrative act affected by the law that the bureaucratic authority 
considers unconstitutional is not favored by basic principles of the constitutional order. 
The constitutional guarantee of speedy trials - which includes administrative 
proceedings - will be victimized by the provision. The idea of chaining the issue up the 
steps of the functional hierarchy to the authority that may eventually provoke judicial 
review faces the obstacle of the delay that this matters for the administrative action. 
In addition, not all administrative authorities have legal standing to bring a 
direct action of unconstitutionality. It should also be remembered that the proposition 
of the action itself falls within the domain of the discretion of the legitimate ones 
(plaintiffs).  
It should be considered that it sounds anachronistic to refuse, in the name of 
the principle of legality, the function of the Constitution as a parameter for the 
Administration. The Constitution is part of the “block of legality” to which the 
Administration must subordinate. The application of the law to the detriment of the 
Constitution also violates legality, as the model of separation of powers from the liberal 
State, coined to reduce the Administration to the exclusive role of the arm of pure and 
simple execution of the legislator's orders, has been superseded. Once the supremacy 
of the parliament is overcome, the moment is to observe the supremacy of the 
Constitution, and there is not enough reason to exclude the Administration from this 
paradigm. 
The model of linking all powers to the Constitution, in turn, encourages a 
structure of mutual control of powers. If there is insecurity in the fact that the 
Administration may refuse to apply an unconstitutional law, there is also insecurity in 
the model of jurisdictional judicial review, especially when the diffuse model is 
admitted. Certainly, in the latter case, insecurity is of minor importance, but it cannot 
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be ruled out. What seems to be decisive is to assess the degree of insecurity that 
society is willing to tolerate. In this regard, it should be noted that unconstitutionality 
presents different levels of difficulty in its perception and different risks arising from its 
affirmation by administrative bodies. 
On the other hand, if it is true that there are differences in the application of 
legal techniques among the various agencies of the Administration, it is no less correct 
to bear in mind that some of them are necessarily composed of professionals who must 
show refinement in their dealings with the Law. If the systemic risks of the admission 
of judicial review by administrative bodies in these cases do not disappear, they 
become less intense. 
Those ponderations are relevant to those who do not entirely deny the 
possibility of judicial review by administrative bodies, when it is indispensable to 
prevent or remedy significant damage. Hence the fact that where this administrative 




6  CONCLUSION: THE CNJ AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW BY 
ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES 
 
The Constitutional Amendment nº. 45/2004 instituted the National Council of 
Justice, committing it to ensure the observance of art. 37, CF/88. These principles of 
legality, impersonality, morality, publicity and efficiency incorporate notions of open 
denoting context, requiring concretization by the applicator / interpreter (in this case, 
the CNJ), which, not infrequently, is called to resolve collisions between law and 
constitutional values. The Council was conceived with a singular composition21, but, 
although it is established that it is a body of the national Judiciary Power, but with no 
jurisdictional attributions. 
Given these relevant features, it can be seen that, intuitively, the STF's case 
 
21 See item 2 above. 
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law takes into account the factors mentioned above as relevant to resolve the issue of 
the admissibility of administrative judicial review. 
From the examination of the precedents collected, it can be seen that the 
Supreme Court is averse to admitting that the CNJ exercises some kind of abstract 
judicial review. The agency's actions must be based on concrete situations, even 
though the STF has shown itself to be tolerant of issuing guidelines arising from the 
judgment rendered by the Council.22 It turns out that the absolute veto on any review 
in this case does not seem to be the current orientation of the Court, although it does 
not grant the Council a broad competence of judicial review. 
The STF's adherence to the shared care of defenders of a restricted and 
limited power of non-application of laws that are unconstitutional by administrative 
bodies is also noted. The Court invariably has a concern to single out the situation of 
the CNJ in the context of the administrative bodies in general. Thus, coinciding with 
the argumentative alerts seen in the previous item, the precedents point out that the 
CNJ is substantially made up of renowned jurists of broad jurisdictional practice. What 
is captured in this step is the notion that this factor is important to admit the control of 
constitutionality (judicial review) by the body, since it reduces the risks of errors and 
reduces legal uncertainty. 
Finally, STF case law highlights the fact that the concrete judicial review by the 
CNJ should be seen as truly exceptional. It is accepted this judicial review by CNJ if 






22 It is important to note that the decision of the STF, Pet 4656 / PB , Petição, Relatora: Mina. Cármen 
Lúcia, Julgamento:  19/12/2016, Voto do Min. Luiz Fux, Órgão Julgador:  Tribunal Pleno, inaugurated a 
new vision of the powers of the CNJ, combining the judicial control of constitutionality of administrative 
acts from article 37, CF/88, which is provided in item II of § 4 of article 103-B, CF/88, with the regulatory 
power attributed to the National Council of Justice. This regulatory power results from item I of § 4 of 
art. 103-B, in which the Council has the duty to "ensure the autonomy of the Judiciary and compliance 
with the Statute of the Judiciary, and may issue regulatory acts, within the scope of its competence, or 
recommend meatsures". On the regulatory power of the CNJ, see PEDERSOLI, 2011. 
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